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Although cases involving the basic contract elements of offer,
acceptance, and consideration are not frequently litigated at the
appellate level, several problems arose during the survey period
regarding these basic elements. The main question to be decided
was whether or not a contract had been formed.
As a general rule an offer is revocable at any time before it is
accepted. If consideration is given to keep the offer open for
a set period, then the offer must remain open for that period.
However, in the absence of such consideration, the offer is fully
revocable.1
McManus v. Little2 involved a revocable offer and several
problems surrounding its revocation. In that case the plaintiff
commenced an action against the defendant for personal injury
and property damage arising out of an automobile accident.
After the accident but before the commencement of the action,
the defendant's insurance company was placed in receivership,
thus making the defendant an uninsured motorist. Plaintiff
therefore served copies of the summons and complaint on her
own insurer, Nationwide, under her uninsured motorist pro-
vision. Before trial the plaintiff executed a purported re-
lease relinquishing her claim against the defendant in return
for the Insurance Commissioner's promise to recommend that
her claim be recognized by the receivership court as a claim on
the insurer's receivership estate instead. Before the recommenda-
tion was made the plaintiff notified all parties that she intended
to pursue her original claim under the uninsured motorist clause
of her own insurance policy with Nationwide. Nationwide and
the defendant set up the purported release as an affirmative
defense and the plaintiff moved to have the defense stricken.
The lower court struck the defense and the appeal followed.
The supreme court found that a valid release had not been
completed and affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court held
that the purported release was only an offer of settlement which
1. But the UCC makes a merchant's signed offer to buy or sell goods
irrevocable for a reasonable time not exceeding three months, regardless of
consideration, provided the offer contains such an assurance. S.C. CoDE ANN.
§ 10.2-205 (1966).
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was revocable until accepted -it was an executory accord.3 "To
amount to a bar the accord must be fully performed." 4 Since
the terms of the accord were never fully performed, the pur-
ported release amounted to only an uncompleted attempt at
settlement.5
Havird v. Schssell6 concerned an alleged contract to make
mutual wills. In 1964, the plaintiff and the defendant's testator,
Lee Havird, had executed mutual wills whereby they devised
their respective estates to one another. Before his death and
without the plaintiff's knowledge Havird changed his will so
that the plaintiff received nothing. The plaintiff sued to have
the 1964 will enforced. Since there was no written contract and
the witnesses called could not testify to specific knowledge of
such a contract, the supreme court found insufficient evidence
that the 1964 wills were made pursuant to any agreement to
keep them in force.7 To prove the existence of such an oral
contract the burden of proof is extremely great and the plaintiff
failed to carry this burden.
In Maw v. McAlister,8 the supreme court held that the plain-
tiff's failure to read a contract did not invalidate his acceptance
of its terms. The plaintiff had signed a release for personal
injuries and property damage resulting from an automobile
accident. The plaintiff, who was unable to read, was assured by
the insurance carrier's agent that the agreement he signed was
3. Id. at 495, 163 S.E.2d at 615. The court defined an executory accord as:
... an agreement embodying a promise to accept at some future
time a stipulated performance in satisfaction of a present claim
or obligation and a corresponding promise to render such per-
formance in satisfaction of such claim or obligation .... [A]s
long as the accord is executory, it is revocable at will by either
party.
4. Id. See also State ex rel Bayer v. Funk, 105 Or. 134, 209 P. 592 (1921)
(cited by the court).
5. See Lucas v. Southern Ry., 156 S.C. 529, 153 S.E. 568 (1930). In that
case Southern offered the plaintiff $5,000 in settlement for a personal injury
claim. There was a written form which had to be approved before the settle-
ment was complete. Since it was never approved by Southern's agent, the
court determined that it was only an offer of settlement by the plaintiff which
had never been accepted.
6. 251 S.C. 416, 162 S.E.2d 877 (1968).
7. This case was summarily disposed of by reference to the earlier case of
Looper v. Whitaker, 231 S.C. 219, 98 S.E.2d 266 (1957), involving similar
facts. However, the court did restate the South Carolina law with respect to
degree of proof of an oral contract to make mutual wills. This law is in
general accord with the majority of jurisdictions in the United States. The
"testimony in a case of this kind must be clear, definite, and convincing. It
must more than preponderate. It must be clear and must convince." Id. at
228, 98 S.E.2d at 271, quoting Stuckey v. Truett, 124 S.C. 122, 127, 192 S.E.
192, 194 (1923).
8. 166 S.E.2d 203 (S.C. 1969).
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for property damage only. Relying on this statement, he failed
to get anyone to read the agreement to him. When the plaintiff
discovered the true content of the release, he brought suit and
recovered a judgment for $40,000. The defendant, who had
based his defense on the release, appealed.
The supreme court restated the settled rule that one must read
and attempt to understand the meaning of a contract that he
signs and cannot complain of fraud and misrepresentation of
the contents of a written contract when he could have learned
the truth by reading it.9 Exceptions are made in the case of the
"ignorant and unwary".10 The plaintiff in this case, however,
although illiterate, had considerable business experience and the
court found him negligent in putting so much trust in an ad-
verse party that he failed to have the contract read to him.
Therefore the release was enforced and the lower court reversed.
II. INTERPIETATION OF CONTRAoT LANGUAGE
One task which frequently confronts all courts is the interpre-
tation of contractual language. The purpose of the court is not
to rewrite the contract but rather to determine the exact under-
standing of the parties. Although parol or extrinsic evidence is
not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract, such
evidence is allowed to aid the court in determining the intentions
of the parties." Several cases arose during the survey period
involving this familiar rule of parol evidence.
In United States v. Fullerton Constouction Co.1 2 the United
States Army granted the defendant a contract to construct a
central heating and refrigeration plant at Fort Jackson. The
defendant-company then took bids on the plumbing work and
signed an agreement with Sligh Construction Company for such
plumbing work. Sligh's bid was based on two drawings and a
9. See O'Connor v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 217 S.C. 442, 60 S.E.2d
884 (1950); J.B. Colt Co. v. Britt, 129 S.C. 226, 123 S.E. 845 (1924). See
also 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 137 (1957).
10. See, e.g., Thomas v. American Workmen, 197 S.C. 178, 14 S.E.2d 886
(1941), involving an illiterate Negro woman who was unable to read or write
and who had no business experience. A release had been falsely represented to
her and it was determined that she fit into the category of the ignorant and
unwary.
11. Bruce v. Blalock, 241 S.C. 155, 127 S.E.2d 439 (1962); Eureka Elastic
Paint Co. v. Bennett-Hedgpeth Co., 85 S.C. 486, 67 S.E. 738 (1910); 32A
CJ.S. Evidetice § 959(1) (1964).
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reference to a term in the main contract dealing with "plumb-
ing". Neither the drawings nor the main contract required Sligh
to lay a water main in the street. When Sligh completed its
work without laying the main, Fullerton refused payment.
In ordering payment the court found that the agreement
between Fullerton and Sligh was vague enough to permit the use
of parol evidence to determine the true intention of the parties.13
The court referred to the drawings, the "plumbing" section of
the main contract, and the general understanding in the plumb-
ing business to determine that the parties could not have in-
tended that Sligh lay the water main. Therefore, Sligh had
fully performed and was entitled to payment.
In Diamond Swimming Pool Co. v. Broome14 the plaintiff
contracted to build a swimming pool for the defendant. The
defendant later gave the plaintiff's agent a landscape drawing
for the whole patio and instructed him to make the pool fit
into this overall building plan. The pool as built was smaller
than called for in the original contract but conformed to the
landscape drawing. The court determined that the written
contract had been later modified by the drawing so that the
plaintiff had successfully performed the contract. 15
A supplier of lumber to a contractor required a written
guarantee of payment from the owner and the contractor in
GCantt v. Van der Hoe. 16 The owner signed a paper as follows:
March 12, 1966
Mr. D.W. Baxter
Atlas Lumber Co., Inc.
Atlas Road, Columbia
I, William A. Gantt, agrees (sic) with the above
named Corporation to pay at completion of contract
[emphasis added] a part of the total sum to Atlas Lum-
ber Co., Inc., and Van's Builders Inc. jointly for the
amount of Six Thousand Dollars ($6000.00).
William A. Gantt
/s/William A. Gantt
13. See Proffitt v. Sitton, 244 S.C. 206, 136 S.E.2d 257 (1964) ; Breedin v.
Smith, 126 S.C. 346, 120 S.E. 64 (1923).
14. 166 S.E.2d 308 (S.C. 1969).
15. Extrinsic evidence such as the landscape drawings would not be admis-
sible to show a prior or contemporaneous agreement which varied the terms of
a written contract. However, ,such evidence can be used to show a subsequent
agreement since such agreements do not fall within the parol evidence rule.
16. 251 S.C. 307, 162 S.E2d 267 (1968).
19691
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss4/3
SoUTH CAROLINA LAw R Vmw
Atlas Lumber quit supplying when it did not receive periodic
payments and obtained a mechanic's lien on the work done. The
owner sued to have the mechanic's lien dissolved.
The supreme court found that the plaintiff-owner's under-
standing was simply that Atlas wanted the assurance that the
check for payment of the work would be made jointly to itself
and Van Builders. The court further found that the plaintiff
understood that the house was to be completed before payment.
Atlas' officers, believing this document to contain a promise to
make periodic payments, had accepted the paper without reading
it. The court held that Gantt's liability under the contract could
not be enlarged upon simply because Atlas misunderstood its
terms. Since Gantt's condition for payment- completion of
his house -never arose, no liability attached.
In She y v. SoUthern Ry.,17 Southern had leased a site near
its tracks to Shealy Furniture Company for a warehouse. In the
lease was an indemnity agreement which provided that Shealy
would be responsible for any damage to Southern's property
resulting from the proximity of the building to the railroad
tracks. There was an exception clause in the agreement, how-
ever, which absolved Shealy of liability in the event of an acci-
dent in which only Southern was negligent.18 Extensive damage
was done to Shealy's warehouse when a railroad car derailed
and ran into it. Shealy instituted suit and Southern set up the
indemnity agreement as a defense. Shealy moved to strike this
defense.
The district court interpreted the agreement to mean that if
the damage done was in any way attributable either to the mere
presence of the warehouse or to Shealy's negligence, then the
indemnity agreement would be a defense.19 However, the
court also stated that if the damages were in no way attributable
to the presence of the warehouse or the negligence of Shealy's
agents then the indemnity agreement would be no defense to the
17. 287 F. Supp. 713 (D.S.C. 1968).
18. "[T]he Licensee [Shealy] shall not be held responsible for any
[damage] accruing from [Southern's] own negligence, without fault of the
Licensee, his servants or employees." Id. at 714.
19. Id. at 714. Although an indemnity agreement is normally thought of as
a sword with which the indemnitee recovers his loss, the court in this case
found no reason why it could not serve as a shield against suit by the in-
demnitor. The language of the agreement seems to support this view:
"[Shealy] covenants ... to protect ... [Southern] and save it wholly harmless
from ... damage... attributable. . . to the presence of [Shealy's] property..
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suit by Shealy.20 Since the indemnity agreement would other-
wise constitute a valid defense, Shealy's motion to strike was
denied.
III. CoNrrONs
At common law, when one party must perform his part of the
contract before the other party is required to perform his, there
is a dependent condition which must be met to make the con-
tract enforceable. This was true in Gantt v. Van der Hoek, 21
supra, where the defendant had to complete the building of a
house before the plaintiff was required to pay.
At common law the "perfect tender" rule required a party to
tender complete performance complying exactly with the terms
of the contract before the other party was required to perform.22
This rule has been modified in most jurisdictions including
South Carolina. The new rule is that if one party has sub-
stantially performed his obligation the other party is bound to
perform.23 The court must determine from the facts of each
case what constitutes a substantial performance. When sub-
stantial performance is found in construction contracts a setoff
is allowed the owner for the amount that it will cost to complete
the contract as written.
In Diamond Swirmig Pool Co. v. Broomne24 the supreme
court found that a pool built by the plaintiff conformed closely
enough to the required contract measurement to constitute
substantial performance.2 5 A problem with regard to the amount
of setoff is discussed below.
20. Id. at 715-16. In interpreting this particular indemnity agreement, the
court relied heavily on the case of Southern Ry. v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
145 F2d 304 (4th Cir. 1944), involving a similar agreement. The court
also applied the principle that in the absence of an unequivocal expression of
intent to the contrary, an indemnity clause will not indemnify an indemnitee
for loss resulting from his own negligent acts. See 41 Am. JuR. 2d Indenmity
§ 15 (1968).
21. 251 S.C. 307, 162 S.E.2d 267 (1968).
22. The UCC abridges this "perfect tender" branch of the rule in the sale
of goods by permitting an imperfect tender to be "cured." S.C. CoDE ANN. §§
10.2-601 and 10.2-508 (1966).
23. See, e.g., Leonard v. Peoples Tobacco Warehouse Co., 128 S.C. 155, 122
S.E. 678 (1924) ; 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 508(a) (1963).
24. 166 S.E2d 308 (S.C. 1969).
25. The court found that the original contract had been modified by a
landscape drawing which called for a pool containing 924 square feet. The
court noted that the outside coping around a pool is generally included in
measuring the size of the pool. In this case if the outside coping was included,
the pool as constructed would contain 946 square feet. Without including
the coping, the pool would measure 788 square feet.
1969]
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IV. R MED s
Specific performanee is a remedy which is given only in equity
and generally only when the contract concerns "unique things"
such as land.20
When a person who is mentally competent to contract gives
a deed which is "fair, just and equitable"2' then the contract
will be specifically enforced in equity. The general rule, as
in most jurisdictions, is that mere inadequacy of consideration
is not enough to deny specific performance. 28 However, when to
inadequacy of consideration is added other circumstances such as
fraud or "overreaching", enforcement of the contract may be
denied. Such overreaching or "undue influence" often arises
from a confidential or family relationship between the con-
tracting parties, 29 such as lawyer-client, brother-sister, or doctor-
patient.
Hodge v. S7eaP was the first South Carolina case to apply
such principles to the doctor-patient relationship. In that case
the plaintiff-doctor induced the defendant to sell him twenty
acres of land at a fraction of its actual value.31 The doctor took
advantage of the defendant, who was suffering from both
physical and mental diseases growing out of his extensive use of
alcohol, by offering a new Cadillac Coup DeVille, defendant's
special weakness for which was well known, and $4,000.00 for
the land. The doctor also knew that a tax lien of $250,000 had
been filed against the defendant and that his son-in-law had
been negotiating the sale of the land in question to satisfy the
tax claims. These facts along with the confidential relationship
provided enough evidence of overreaching to deny specific
performance of the contract. The court further justified its
decision by drawing an analogy between the doctor-patient re-
26. But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-716 (1966) which is a section of the
Uniform Commercial Code allowing specific performance of a contract for the
sale of goods "in other proper circumstances." These "circumstances" deal
mostly with output and requirements contracts in which a buyer would be
severely damaged if his source of supply refused to provide his needed raw
materials.
27. McChesney v. Smith, 105 S.C. 171, 176, 89 S.E. 639, 641 (1916).
28. See Owens v. Sweatt, 227 S.C. 112, 86 S.E.2d 886 (1955); 26 C.J.S.
Deeds § 60 (1956).
29. 17 CJ.S. Contracts § 181 (1963).
30. 168 S.E.2d 82 (S.C. 1969).
31. The land in this tract had an uncontested market value of $1200 per acre
while Dr. Hodge claimed the right to buy 20 acres of it for a consideration
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lationship and other confidential relationships which had arisen
in earlier cases.
32
In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. DeLoaahe33 the defendant's
intestate had given the plaintiff an option to lease a tract of
land as a filling station site. After the death of the intestate the
plaintiff sought to exercise its option but the defendant refused
to honor the agreement. Several grounds were raised by the
defendant for denial of specific performance of the contract,
only one of which merits discussion. 34 Afutuality of remedy was
a common law rule which held that both parties must have had
equal remedies for breach of contract before the contract was
valid.35  In the Humble Oil case the defendant pleaded a want
of mutuality of remedy as grounds for denial of specific per-
formance. Humble had the right on thirty days notice and upon
payment of one year's rent to cancel the lease. Since the de-
fendant had no similar right, he contended that the contract was
void.
The problem facing the federal district court was said to be
one of novel impression in South Carolina. Therefore the court
32. See, e.g., Devlin v. Devlin, 89 S.C. 268, 71 S.E. 966 (1911) ; Zeigler v.
Shuler, 87 S.C. 1, 68 S.E. 817 (1910); Wile v. Wille, 57 S.C. 413, 35 S.E.
804 (1900).
33. 297 F. Supp. 647 (D.S.C. 1969).
34. The other grounds raised for denial of specific performance should be
noted:
1. Mental incompetency -The district court found that the
intestate met the test set forth in DuBose v. Kell, 90 S.C. 196,
71 S.E. 371 (1911), and was therefore competent to contract.
That test measures a party's ability to understand the subject
matter of the contract and to comprehend its consequences. If
a party can adequately do that then he is competent to contract.
In this case the intestate had negotiated several important con-
tracts and the contract under contention was reasonable enough
to make the court decide that the intestate fully understood
what he was doing.
2. Failure to make tender of payment-After the defendant re-
fused to perform the option, the plaintiff did not tender rent but
began the suit for specific performance. The court held that
when the vendor repudiates the contract or where it is evident
that a tender would be unavailing, equity will not deny specific
performance to the vendee due to his failure to make tender.
Accord Shannon v. Freeman, 117 S.C. 480, 109 S.E. 406 (1921).
3. Inadequacy of consideration alone is not grounds for denial of
specific performance. See, e.g., Owens v. Sweatt, 227 S.C. 112,
86 S.E.2d 886 (1955); 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 60 (1956).
35. The doctrine arose in England in the early 19th century and was
accepted in America at about the same time. It became known as the Fry rule
after the publication of FRY ON SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE in 1858. Exceptions
began to appear from the beginning until they almost swallowed the rule.
This caused many courts to abandon it and today the rule is unpopular in those
few states that have retained it. For a more detailed discussion of the
development and status of the rule see Annot., 22 A.L.R. 2d 508 (1952).
1969]
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surveyed other jurisdictions for help in reaching its decision.
In a very comprehensive opinion, the court ruled that the
mutuality rule had been riddled with so many exceptions that it
was no longer a valid rule.36 In ordering specific performance,
the court noted that the plaintiff did not have the right to cancel
the lease at will, so there was no inequity.37 The court reasoned
that to deny specific performance to a party simply because he
could cancel the lease after reasonable notice would create an
unreasonable result.3 8
The court's opinion and the decision reached in this case are
interesting for several reasons. Since the rule, in form at least,
is still well-established in the United States that mutuality of
remedy must be present before specific performance will be
granted, it would appear that the district court in Humble
moved in a progressive direction.
On closer examination it appears that the general rule is more
of form than substance and is seldom given force or effect.39
An examination of the several pages of cases cited by the court
in Humble will reveal to the reader that there was much pre-
cedent in the United States for the decision the court reached.
The court dismissed the only South Carolina case which made
any reference to the problem of mutuality of remedy.40 In that
case the court had referred to an "original want of mutuality"
as a bar to specific performance; and the Humble court inter-
preted this statement as a reference to a lack of consideration
rather than a lack of mutual remedies.41 A closer examination
of the Columbia Water Powe7a2 case makes this interpretation
somewhat questionable, but it is in this respect that the court
did in effect take a progressive step. Instead of following an
antiquated rule which created more inequities than it prevented,
the court admirably chose to go with the progressive tide.
36. See Epstein v. Gluckln, 233 N.Y. 490, 135 N.E. 861 (1922), in which
Mr. Justice Cardozo noted that the rule "has been so qualified by exceptions
that, viewed as a precept of general validity it has ceased to be a rule today."
297 F. Supp. at 657. I
37. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. DeLoache, 297 F. Supp. 647, 657 n.8
(D.S.C. 1969).
38. Id. at 660.
39. See, e.g., 11 WILsroN ON CONTRACTS § 1440 (3d ed. 1968); RFSTATE-
MENT OF CONTrACTS § 372(1) (f) (1932).
40. Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia, 5 S.C. 225 (Cir. Ct. 1873).
41. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. DeLoache, 297 F. Supp. 647, 657 (D.S.C.
1969).




Published by Scholar Commons, 1969
CONTRACTS SURVEYED
Set-off. In Diamond Swimming Pool Co. v. Broome43 the
lower court, affirming the master's report, ordered a set-off of
$1275 instead of the defendant's requested $3400. The defen-
dants had the burden of proving the exact amount of damages
in not having the pool constructed to specifications. Although
the only witness on the cost of completion testified that the
damages were $3400, his failure to itemize these damages
vitiated the defendant's proof. The supreme court affirmed judg-
ment for the plaintiff.
V. Comm iCAI TRANSACTIONS
The problem of when title passes to specific goods which come
from a larger stock confronted many courts before the passage
of the UCC.44 It was generally held that title to specific goods
in a deliverable state passed at the time the contract was formed.
However, the intention of the parties controlled; and if they
expressed an intent 'that title was to pass at some later time, then
title did not pass until this time.45 When goods were to come
from a larger stock then title did not pass until these goods were
separated, tagged, or set aside in some way from the larger
stock.
40
These principles were applied in In re ColoniaZ Distributing
Company.47 Several liquor store owners purchased large quanti-
ties of wines and liquors from the Colonial Distributing Com-
pany. These goods were to remain in Colonial's warehouse and
were to be delivered upon demand to the purchasers. The wines
and liquors were not marked or set aside in any way. When the
purchasers later learned of Colonial's bankruptcy, they sought,
but were denied, delivery of the goods. The purchasers then
obtained the goods through claim and delivery proceedings.
The trustee in bankruptcy for Colonial sought to have the de-
livery voided as a preference.48 If title to the goods had passed
43. 166 S.E2d 308 (S.C. 1969). Other aspects of this case are discussed
sitpra.
44. Although the UCC contains several specific provisions aimed at reducing
substantially the importance of the title concept, it does set forth general rules
which continue to govern formal passage of title. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-401
(1966). (The UCC was not in effect in South Carolina when the present case
arose.)
45. See 77 C.J.S. Sales § 246 (1952).
46. Id. § 253(1). See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-401 (1966) which requires
that the goods be "identified" before title will pass.
47. 291 F. Supp. 154 (D.S.C. 1968).
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 96 (a) (1) (1968). A preference, briefly, is the pay-
ment of an antecedent debt within four months of the beginning of bankruptcy
1969]
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at the time the purchase price was paid then the purchasers
would not have received a voidable preference -since the pay-
ment of this purchase price had not occurred within four months
of the bankruptcy proceedings. However, the special master in
bankruptcy determined that title had not passed at that time
since the goods were not set aside in any way. Therefore, the
purchasers had received a voidable preference and had to pay
for the liquors that they had taken. The United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina accepted the report of
the master and ordered the purchasers to pay.
VI. LEoIsATIoN
Two statutes were passed during the past legislative session
dealing with interest rates on contracts for money loans. The
first40 amended Section 8-3 of the 1962 Code by raising the
interest rate ceiling on written contracts for loans from seven
to eight per cent. The maximum interest rate absent an express
agreement remains at six per cent.
The second, 0 now Section 8-8.1 of the South Carolina Code,
states that Sections 8-2, 8-3, 8-5, 8-7, and 8-9 of the South
Carolina Code (the usury laws) do not apply to loans of fifty
thousand dollars or more. A ten per cent interest rate may be
charged on loans between fifty and one hundred thousand dol-
lars and a twelve per cent rate is allowed on loans between one
hundred and five hundred thousand dollars, according to the
statute.
JAmES BUCKINGHAm PAsrAY
proceedings against the debtor if it serves to benefit the creditor to which it
is given at the expense of others like him. A preference is detrimental to the
other creditors since they are left to divide the depleted remainder of the
bankrupt's estate, getting only a fraction of the debt owed to them. Such
preferences are voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy.
49. R343, May 20, 1969.
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